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Timothy O’Connor’s book Theism and Ultimate Explanation is a force 
to be reckoned with.1 Not only does it offer a defense of a new version of 
the cosmological argument but the argument comes embedded in a defense 
of nondeflationary modality and its role in both everyday and scientific ex-
planation, and an epistemology of possibility and necessity. The arguments 
one finds in Theism and Ultimate Explanation are both philosophically and 
scientifically informed and in many cases highly original. In addition to these 
many virtues, Theism and Ultimate Explanation exemplifies one other great-
making property as well as any book I can recall: authorial bravery. At pretty 
much every turn (and the book has as many turns as a two-lane highway in 
the Ozarks), O’Connor takes a position that is philosophically unpopular 
(he is an Aristotelian about causation, an agent-causation libertarian, and an 
emergentist in addition to being a theist who thinks that the existence of a 
contingent universe is a good argument for a necessarily existent deity). That 
he is able to defend these positions so ably is a testament to O’Connor’s sig-
nificant philosophical chops.
In this essay, I will comment on two places where I think O’Connor has 
not made his case in a compelling way. My two points concern the accept-
ability of a brute fact view of the universe and the implications of a contin-
gent God. Regarding the former, I will argue that, contrary to what O’Connor 
claims, we have no good reason to prefer an account according to which the 
universe is contingent and explained via a necessary being to that of a natu-
aBsTraCT: Timothy O’Connor’s book Theism and Ultimate Explanation offers a defense of 
a new version of the cosmological argument. In his discussion, O’Connor argues against the 
coherence of a brute fact “explanation” of the universe and for the claim that the God of the-
ism cannot be logically contingent. In this paper, I take issue with both of these arguments. 
Regarding the former, I claim that contrary to what O’Connor asserts, we have no good reason 
to prefer an account according to which the universe is explained via a necessary being to that 
of a naturalist who thinks that the universe is contingent and ultimately unexplained. Regard-
ing the latter, I argue that the possibility of a logically contingent God is fully consistent with 
traditional theism.
1. Timothy O’Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contin-
gency (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008).
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ralist who thinks that the universe is contingent and ultimately unexplained. 
Regarding the latter, I will argue that, contrary to O’Connor’s argument in 
the last chapter of his book, the possibility of a logically contingent God is 
fully consistent with traditional theism.
On the Acceptability of a Brute Naturalism
Although I stated at the outset that O’Connor presents a new version 
of the cosmological argument, that claim is arguable: it is not that there is 
doubt about O’Connor’s originality but rather the degree to which he sees 
what he has done as presented an argument for what he terms “Logos”—that 
is, a necessary, personal being with highly unified properties whose creative 
power is the explanation of the existence of all contingently existing objects. 
At no point in Theism and Ultimate Explanation do we get anything that 
looks explicitly like an argument: that is, there are no marked premises from 
which a conclusion is derived. O’Connor is clear that he does not see what 
he is offering as a demonstration of a necessary being. The kind of argument 
we get from O’Connor is an inference to the best explanation. In order for 
the criticism that I will be pushing in this section to be clear, I will have to 
summarize the argument briefly (which turns out to be rather tricky). 
The “traditional metaphysician’s quest” is to find an “ultimate explana-
tion of the most general features of the world we inhabit.”2 Finding an ex-
planation the details of which are knowable by us is unrealistic; what we can 
reasonably hope for, though, is an explanation schema or framework—that 
is, a broad outline that allows for the possibility of a “correct and complete” 
(ix) ultimate explanation. What we are looking for, O’Connor avers is, an 
answer to the existence question, his favored version of which is: Are there 
contingently existing objects and if there are why do these particular contin-
gent objects exist and undergo the events they do? The traditional answer is 
that contingent objects exist and undergo the events they undergo because 
they are the products of the activity of a transcendent being who acts for rea-
sons. In addition to the traditional answer, O’Connor considers the follow-
ing possible alternatives: (i) a beginningless universe of contingent beings 
provides an adequate explanation for each being and hence the inference of 
a necessary being is unmotivated (Hume); (ii) the universe of contingent be-
ings exists because it should (John Leslie and Derek Parfit); (iii) the universe 
is not contingent but necessary (Spinoza); and that (iv) the universe is the 
product of an impersonal, mechanistic necessary being (as opposed to a per-
sonal being who acts from reasons). Along the way, O’Connor also defends 
the coherence of the concept of necessary existence and rebuts the charge 
2. Ibid., ix.
that if the ground of all reality is a necessary being, then modality implodes 
and all beings (and events) are necessary.
The conclusion of the existence of a personal, transcendent necessary 
being is drawn from the fact that it best explains the world of contingent ob-
jects. Now it seems to me that what is striking about the argument as we have 
it is not so much what is on the list of alternative accounts that O’Connor 
considers but what is not. Surely the chief rival to the traditional answer, and 
the position most broadly accepted in the philosophical community, is not 
any of four listed above. The main alternative to theism is a naturalistic view 
that sees the universe as logically contingent but ultimately unexplained: in 
short, naturalism that adds that the existence of the universe is a brute fact. 
For ease of reference, let us call this view “brute naturalism.” So why isn’t 
this alternative to the traditional answer given its due?
O’Connor is not without an explanation. First, notice the form of the 
question that the traditional answer answers (O’Connor dubs this “the exis-
tence question”): Are there contingently existing objects and if there are why 
do these particular contingent objects exist and undergo the events they do? 
The naturalist will say that the first question has an answer (“yes”) but the 
second question does not. And since a conjunctive question does not have an 
answer if one of its conjuncts has no answer, the brute naturalist is commit-
ted to thinking that the existence question is unanswerable. And since she 
does not provide an answer, her position is not one that needs to be ruled out 
when one is attempting to determine which answer to the existence question 
is best. Another way to appreciate this is that an inference to the best expla-
nation argument is, after all, an inference to the best explanation. But if the 
naturalist does not offer an explanation for contingent reality, then she does 
not offer a candidate best explanation. So there is nothing arbitrary about 
O’Connor’s failing to discuss in any detail the possibility of contingent, un-
explained universe.
Still, granting that the exclusion of the brute naturalist position is not 
arbitrary is not to condone its absence. What is the reason for giving pref-
erence to positions that give a positive answer to the existence question? 
Why not include in the discussion the perspective that denies the existence 
question is answerable? After arguing that there is no chance there will be 
a naturalistic answer to the existence question and that there is no reason to 
think that the appeal to nonempirical factors in an ultimate explanation is 
“otiose, confused, vacuous, or in some other way impertinent or at the very 
least unseemly, coming from the lips of a modern thinker,”3 O’Connor says 
the following:
Now, prima facie, it seems unreasonable to say that the [existence] 
question is a perfectly coherent one, and that it correctly presupposes 
that the universe and everything therein need not have existence—that 
3. Ibid., 69.
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is to say, its existence is entirely contingent—and nonetheless hold 
that there is no answer to it: hold that the universe’s existence is sim-
ply a brute, unexplainable fact. It seems even more unreasonable, then 
to deny that, other things being equal, given two metaphysics such 
that one of them provides a final, nonarbitrary answer to the existence 
question and one of which leaves it unanswerable, we should prefer 
the one that answers it on account of its greater explanatory power.4
O’Connor’s answer, then, to the question of why brute naturalism does 
not get more of a hearing is that it would be unreasonable ( prima facie, 
anyway) to hold that the universe is contingent, that the existence question 
is coherent, and yet that brute naturalism is true. And it would be even more 
unreasonable to hold the contingency of the universe, the coherence of the 
existence question and yet not prefer a metaphysic that provided an answer 
to that question over one that did not since, clearly, the former would have 
greater explanatory power. 
That each of these positions is unreasonable is not obvious. For I do not 
see why recognizing the coherence of the existence question carries with it 
the presumption that it has a positive answer. Consider an analogy: while 
walking in the woods, you come across four large stones at the base of a hill; 
the stones are so arranged that a parallelogram can be made from lines con-
necting the stones. Looking around you notice many other stones at the base 
of this hill but there is no other group of them that similarly can be used to 
form a standard geometric shape. It occurs to you to wonder whether these 
rocks were placed in their positions by someone who intended to outline a 
parallelogram or whether it is simply a matter of chance that the stones are 
where they are. So you ask yourself: why are these particular stones arranged 
as they are (call this “the position question”)? 
It should be noted that this case bears only an analogical relation to the 
case involving the existence question and the universe. For my stone case, 
there is no serious possibility that it is simply a brute fact that the stones are 
arranged as they are. Even if there is no agency behind their positions, there 
will be a causal explanation for each being where it is and there is nothing 
over and above the positions of the four stones that needs explaining. So 
in the stone case, broadly speaking, the choice is between there being an 
explanation involving agency (or maybe some other way of explaining the 
positions of the stones that does not imply that they are where they are “just 
by chance”) and their having their positions just by chance. In the case of 
the universe, most broadly construed, the choice is between there being an 
explanation of the collection of contingent things, on the one hand, and there 
being no explanation of them on the other. Still, I think the stone analogy can 
be helpful so let us get back to it.
4. Ibid., 69–70.
Should I grant that the position question is coherent? I do not see why 
not. However, I might think it is ambiguous between “Why did someone so 
arrange the stones?” and “How did the stones come to be where they are?” If 
the former is the intended understanding of the question, then while I grant 
that it is coherent, it presumes too much and therefore if its assumptions are 
not true, then it may not have an answer. On the other hand, the second read-
ing of the question makes no such assumptions and will have an answer even 
if it is only that it is purely by chance that the rocks are in that arrangement.
Let us look back now to the relevant part of the existence question: why 
do these particular contingent objects exist and undergo the events they do? 
Is this a coherent question? Sure, although it might be thought ambiguous 
in a way analogous to the question of the stone example. If it means “What 
is the explanation for why contingent objects exist and undergo the events 
they do?” (presuming that there is an explanation) then the question simply 
assumes the falsity of brute naturalism. It is, then, no wonder that brute natu-
ralism does not get taken seriously as an alternative but that is just because it 
is ruled out of court without a hearing. On the alternative reading, the ques-
tion is asking “Is there an explanation for why these particular contingent 
objects exist and undergo the events they do, and if there is, what is it?” This, 
too, is clearly coherent and presupposes only that contingent objects do exist 
(recall that the official formulation of the existence question begins with a 
question about whether there are contingent objects so it does not even really 
make this assumption). The key question now is whether it is prima facie 
unreasonable to grant the coherence of this question while thinking that the 
answer to it is no and whether it is “even more unreasonable” not to favor 
(other things being equal) an account that answers this question with a non-
arbitrary, fundamental explanation over brute naturalism on the basis of the 
former’s explanatory power.
I find the appeal to explanatory power odd in this context. For it is surely 
true that explanatory power is a significant virtue in a theory that accounts 
for phenomena for which there is clearly some explanation. But the brute 
naturalist is likely to be unmoved by an appeal to explanatory power regard-
ing a phenomenon that she thinks has no explanation. 
At bottom, the $64,000 question is to what extent the bare existence of 
a contingent universe cries out for explanation. If it does loudly and clearly, 
then O’Connor is right that (other things being equal) a metaphysic that offers 
an explanation for it is to be preferred over one that does not. However, if the 
bare existence of a contingent universe is not in itself particularly surprising, 
then the presumption against brute naturalism is greatly diminished.
In concluding this section, let me just say that I do not find the bare 
existence of a contingent universe to be something that obviously needs ex-
plaining. Keep in mind, that what we are talking about here is the bare ex-
istence of a contingent universe. There may be features of the universe that 
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do clearly beg for explanation (its being fine-tuned for life, say), but the fact 
that there is something contingent rather than nothing at all does not strike 
me as one of them.
The Possibility of Brute Theism
Having argued that brute naturalism has not been shown to be unreason-
able on the grounds that O’Connor claims, I want to conclude by considering 
what I hereby dub “brute theism”—the claim that the universe was freely 
created by a contingent God. 
O’Connor clearly thinks that to adopt brute theism is to give up much 
of what is important in Christian theism (and perhaps theism in general). He 
claims that “the concept of God implicit in certain claims at the heart of the 
Biblical revelation themselves require articulation in the metaphysical terms 
of necessary being” and “. . . any minimally acceptable understanding of 
God’s sovereign control over what happens in the world implicitly requires 
the concept of necessary being.”5
These are strong assertions that I think are incorrect. In what follows I 
will briefly sketch a form of brute theism that is quite traditional and which 
hence does not suffer from the debilitating liabilities that concern O’Connor. 
From here on out, let “brute theism” refer to the view sketched below.
According to brute theism, God exists contingently. We must be care-
ful, though, to make clear the type of contingency at issue. To call a be-
ing “contingent” in the relevant sense (and this is the sense that O’Connor 
means) is to say that there are possible worlds at which it does not exist. But 
it does not follow from this variety of contingency that the being’s existence 
is contingent on the causal activity of other beings. Surely, this latter kind of 
contingency is inconsistent with standard theism: God is not ontologically 
beholden to anyone or anything. Still, brute theism gets its name from its 
claim that the existence of God is the ultimate (and only) brute fact—there is 
no explanation for God’s existence and God’s nonexistence is possible.
Even so, the brute theist will maintain both that God’s going out of exis-
tence is not a possibility and that the existence of all other contingent entities 
is (fundamentally) explained by the causal activity of God. But even more: 
God is the only possible source of being and power. That is, necessarily, God 
is the only source of being—every object that could be is causally and on-
tologically dependent on God (except God himself, of course). This implies 
that there is but a single world at which God does not exist since with the 
exception of God himself, no contingent being exists unless it was created 
by God.
5. Ibid., 132, 143 (emphasis in original).
Brute theism insists on the following schema of modalized claims re-
garding the standard divine attributes: “Necessarily, God is P” and “God 
is necessarily P.” That is, brute theism asserts that for omnipotence, omni-
science, omnibenevolence, and the rest, it is both true that nothing can be 
God and lack one of those properties and that the being who is God has those 
properties essentially. 
Let us now take a quick look at the claims O’Connor makes against 
divine contingency:
(1) “If God is not a necessary being . . . then it is possible that there is a 
being which neither owes its existence to Him nor derives its power 
from him. From this it follows that, possibly, there is a being over 
which God has no causal control.”6
Reply: Not at all. Brute theism claims that God is the causal source of 
all that there is or could be. 
(2) “If [God exists contingently], it may turn out to be the case that the 
only objects ever to appear on the scene are those to which He gives 
being. But if it does so turn out, that is a contingent fact whose truth 
He did not (and could not) ensure.”7
Reply: Not at all. The fact that an object exists contingently does not 
mean it could exist apart from that which actually brought it 
about: my existence is contingent but I could not exist in a world 
that fails to contain my parents. So it is with all contingent be-
ings save God: every world in which they are not the products of 
God’s creative activity is a world in which they are not.
The only one of O’Connor’s objections that might cause a problem for 
brute theism is this:
(3) “[If brute theism were true], it seems, [God] could sensibly feel for-
tunate that He happens to exist, even though He owes His existence 
to no existing thing. And that appears to be inadequate, clearly at 
odds with how ordinary theists implicitly regard God’s ontological 
status.”8
Reply: Should the God of brute theism feel fortunate for existing? May-
be. But there is no one to whom God should feel gratitude for 
his good fortune and his continued existence is not something 
for which he is fortunate. The idea that God should feel fortunate 
also seems to invite a crude kind of anthropomorphism that is 
not otherwise a part of brute theism.
Finally, I take issue with the claim that the implication that God would 
feel fortunate to exist is “clearly at odds with how ordinary theists implicitly 
regard God’s ontological status.” O’Connor must attend a very philosophi-
6. Ibid., 141.
7. Ibid., 142.
8. Ibid., 140.
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cally sophisticated church. I am pretty sure that I have never been a member 
of a congregation in which most of the members implicitly reject brute the-
ism and embrace full-on Anselmian theism. It is not that they reject Anselmi-
anism but rather that (as best I can tell) their philosophical theology does not 
distinguish between the views. They are committed to a God who is creator 
of heaven and earth, for whom all things are possible, and whose ways are 
not our ways. Brute theism can see all of this and raise it the necessary de-
pendence of all existing (and possible) things upon God and God’s essential 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Ordinary theists will be 
just fine with this.
